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Abstract 
Published more than 50 years ago, Reinhard Bendix’s classic monograph Max Weber: 
An Intellectual Portrait (1960) exercised an important influence on the early reception of 
Weber’s work in America. With the recent resurgence of interest in defining what 
constitutes ‘the Weberian legacy’, Bendix’s work has taken on renewed significance in 
understanding why the reception process of translation, adaptation and assimilation in 
America produced conflicting interpretations of Weber’s fragmented legacy. In the 
Intellectual Portrait, Bendix sought to provide a synthetic overview of Weber’s oeuvre as 
a whole, effectively rebalancing the earlier interpretative focus on The Protestant Ethic 
and the studies of the world religions by giving equal weight to the analytical treatise of 
Economy and Society, which includes studies of economics, religion, politics, power, 
law and the state. In doing so, Bendix challenged Talcott Parsons’ powerful alternative 
theoretical reading and helped extricate Weber’s historical sociology from the claims of 
functionalism and modernisation theory. Despite this success, Bendix’s Intellectual 
Portrait still exists under the shadow of Parsons’ interpretative legacy, and his reading of 
Weber is often criticised or misrepresented, even by his admirers. For some, he was an 
‘instrumental Weberian’ who exaggerated Weber’s work on conflict and power, while for 
others he was a representative of ‘cultural Weberianism’ who focused on the autonomy 
of intellectual ideas and religious worldviews. In practice, Bendix, like Weber, can be 
adapted and assimilated into both readings. This essay reappraises the Intellectual 
Portrait as an important chapter in the intellectual history of Weber scholarship and 
interpretation. It seeks to re-evaluate Bendix as a Weber interpreter, as well as honour 
his status as a ‘Weberian’: a scholar who sought to reinterpret Weber’s comparative 
historical sociology of the West from the viewpoint of multiple modernities. While Bendix 
deserves this re-evaluation, the essay concludes by suggesting a genealogical 
counterhistory that questions the narrative retelling of the emergence of ‘the Weberian 
legacy’ as a progressive or cumulative process leading to an internally coherent or 
broadly consistent research programme, method, perspective, paradigm or tradition. 
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Introduction 
Reinhard Bendix’s classic book, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (1960), was one 
of the first studies to trace the outlines of Weber’s historical sociology as a whole; for 
some scholars, it is ‘unsurpassed’ as a systematic guide to Weber’s corpus (Kalberg, 
1994: 16). Yet although Bendix’s role as an ‘expositor’ has been recognised, his status 
as a Weber interpreter has been somewhat neglected, both within the larger American 
sociological academy and the various traditions of comparative historical sociology. 
There are various reasons for this neglect but perhaps the most significant is that 
Bendix’s work was always overshadowed by the enormous influence Talcott Parsons 
exercised as translator, theorist and teacher on the initial reception of Weber’s legacy in 
America (Scaff, 2011). Parsons  important translation of The Protestant Ethic (1930) 
was followed by his groundbreaking theoretical work, The Structure of Social Action 
(1937), which had four chapters dedicated to Weber. The publication of The Social 
System (1951) further assured Parsons’ theoretical ascendancy and the creation of a 
‘Weber-Parsons tradition of social theory’, which gradually ‘assimilated’ Weber’s 
diverse writings on religion, capitalism and Western rationalism into the evolutionary 
premises of modernisation theory (Almond, 1956: 393, 2007: 76; Parsons 1963). 
Although initially extremely influential, Parsons reading of Weber was to eventually 
inspire a relentless ‘de-Parsonising of Weber’ that was often polemically motivated 
(Cohen et al., 1975; Gerhardt, 2011; Owens, 2010). In contrast, Bendix’s Intellectual 
Portrait provided one of the first serious attempts to extricate Weber’s legacy from the 
systematic innovations of Parsons’ theoretical synthesis. Its tone was scholarly, erudite 
and rarely polemical. His overall goal was to place Weber within the framework of a 
comparative historical sociology that eschewed all claims to grand theory. Bendix 
(1965b) also made it clear that he wanted to ‘work along Weber’s lines’, rather than 
offer ‘yet another interpretation’ (p. 10).  
The shadow cast by Parsons, Parsonism and its counter-reactions has undoubtedly 
impeded a broader critical appreciation of the significance of the Intellectual Portrait in 
the reception and interpretation of Weber’s work (Caldwell, 2002). Jeffrey Alexander 
(1998) as an early defender of Parsons’ sociology in a post-Parsonian era sought to 
position Bendix’s work as a chapter in the ‘anti-Parsonian reinterpretation of Weber’ and 
the broader search for a theoretical alternative to grand theory that ended in the failed 
paradigm of ‘conflict sociology’ and the temporary revival of ‘neo-functionalism’ (p. 98). 
For Alexander (1983), Bendix was an early advocate of ‘multidimensional Weberianism’ 
who also became a representative of ‘conflict theory’ and ‘instrumental Weberianism’ by 
overstating the role of power and politics in Weber’s work (pp. 131–133). Similarly, 
Collins (1998), in his advocacy of ‘conflict sociology’ as an alternative to functionalism, 
has credited Bendix with introducing Weber as ‘above all a theorist of domination and 
conflict’ who helped spark a revival of research on stratification and ‘the historical 
transformation of the state’ (p. 309). In this respect, Bendix was characterised as the 
‘figurehead for a movement that opened up the sociology of multidimensional conflict, of 
macrohistorical research, of the state as the leading edge of social change’ (Collins, 1998: 
302). From these opposing perspectives, conflict theory versus functionalism, the 
Intellectual Portrait is positioned as an anti-Parsonian attack on grand theory designed 
primarily to shift the interpretative focus from The Protestant Ethic and the studies of the 
world religions to the analytical treatise of Economy and Society, an analytical shift from 
worldviews and ideas to power and politics (Collins, 1998). Further reinforcing these 
views, Kalberg (1997) has suggested that Bendix ‘exaggerated Weber’s emphasis upon 
conflict, inequality, power and ruleship at the expense of the more “cultural Weber” of 
  
The Protestant Ethic’ (p. 210). Since so much of Weber’s (1949) work affirmed the 
‘transcendental presupposition’ of the ‘cultural science’, that we are ‘cultural beings’ in 
search of meaning, this would appear to constitute a very serious criticism (pp. 81, 110). 
But did Bendix’s Intellectual Portrait really affirm Weber as ‘a theorist of conflict’, was 
he really an instrumental Weberian only concerned with power, conflict and coercion? 
And was he overly reliant on a one-sided reading of Economy and Society? 
Paradoxically, Parsons was one of the first reviewers of the Intellectual Portrait to 
recognise Bendix’s cultural reading of Weber, and more recent evaluations also suggest 
that Bendix was a ‘cultural Weberian’ who recognised the strengths and limitations of 
‘instrumental Weberianism’ (Caldwell, 2002; Kiser, 2005; Parsons, 1960; Scaff, 2014). 
Moreover, the idea that Bendix was an advocate of ‘state-centred modernisation’ seems 
increasingly untenable given his forceful critique of ‘methodological nationalism’: for 
Bendix, there is no singular ideal of ‘political modernity’ because it is a contingent 
outcome that cannot be identified with a universal, evolutionary or functionalist ideal of 
‘modern society’ (Chernilo, 2007: 109–110). 
This essay re-examines the scope and significance of Bendix’s Intellectual Portrait 
of Weber’s work by conceiving it as both a ‘Weberian reading of Weber’ (Ringer, 
2004) and a valiant attempt to recover Weber’s oeuvre as a whole – a perhaps almost 
impossible task given the scope, shifting intentions and incompleteness of Weber’s 
work (Scaff, 2014: 2; Whimster, 2007: 9). If Parsons’ classic ‘theoretical’ reading often 
seriously skewed his interpretation of Weber’s oeuvre, then Bendix’s painstaking 
strategy of systematic textual exposition and compression in the Intellectual Portrait 
was a search for greater thematic unity and interpretative authenticity (Roth, 1977b, 
2007). By re-reading the Intellectual Portrait in these terms, what emerges is a 
comprehensive and classic interpretation of Weber as a comparative historical 
sociologist and one of the most balanced, incisive and well-argued criticisms of 
Parsons’ alternative reading. 
The essay begins by briefly exploring the ‘genealogy’ of the Intellectual Portrait; its 
contingent and temporal emergence out of Bendix’s often submerged or ‘shadow 
dialogue’ with Parsons the ‘absent interlocutor’; for Parsons often only becomes 
present in the real and imagined manifestations of his work: Parsonism, functionalism 
and modernisation theory. The primary objective is to explore this dialogue rather than 
provide a narrative account of the historical reception and disciplinary 
institutionalisation of Weber’s work in America and Germany, or the emergence of a 
Weberian research paradigm or tradition; others have pursued those goals (Albert et al., 
2003; Roth, 1977b; Scaff, 2006, 2014). Nor is it possible to provide a comprehensive 
survey of the Intellectual Portrait or its relation to Bendix’s work as a whole. 
Moreover, within the confines of this essay, it is not possible to relate Bendix’s work to 
its biographical context, institutional setting or the eclectic intellectual influences on 
his ideas – except incidentally (see Biographical note by Caldwell, 2002: 46–48; Roth, 
2007). Instead, the interpretative task is to mirror the original integrated ambitions of 
Bendix’s Intellectual Portrait, not by a systematic ‘exposition’ of the book, but by 
pursuing a thematic re-reading which demonstrates that Bendix succeeded in providing 
an alternative Weberian reading to that proposed by Parsons. 
In the course of this thematic analysis, four main arguments are made. First, 
Bendix’s Intellectual Portrait sought to extricate Weber’s ‘image of society’ from the 
legacy of Parsons’ functionalism and evolutionary theory and return it to a broader 
comparative historical understanding of the relationship between society and politics. 
Unlike most efforts to ‘de-Parsonise’ Weber, however, Bendix (1962) was not 
  
motivated by a polemical intent, and his reading placed as much weight on Weber’s 
sociology of religion as it did on his political sociology; effectively blending a 
‘cultural’ and ‘instrumental’ reading of Weber (pp. 265, 474). This is one of the main 
reasons why the Weberian reading Bendix offers in the Intellectual Portrait is more 
subtle and complex than a political sociology of ‘domination and conflict’ might 
suggest (Alexander, 1983; Collins, 1998; Kiser, 2005). In effect, Bendix accepted 
Weber’s ‘transcendental presupposition’ of the cultural sciences, along with his 
political realism. We are culture beings in search for meaning in a meaningless and 
ethically irrational universe, but this search for meaning as value choices does not rule 
out the ‘objective’ pursuit of rational scientific knowledge as a cultural value in a 
disenchanted world, even though this cultural value cannot be justified by science, with 
the result that politics and power have to arbitrate in practice between competing 
values, ethical ideals and political ends (Geuss, 2010). 
Second, unlike Parsons who located Weber’s intellectual legacy in a generally 
optimistic vision of modernity defined by moral progress and rationality, social order 
and liberal democracy, Bendix (1962) sought to demonstrate that Weber’s analysis of 
Western modernity was deeply ambivalent and open-ended (p. 9). Bendix achieved this 
by reconstructing the dynamic of ‘material and ideal interests’ at the core of Weber’s 
‘image of society’. In doing so, he replaced the all-encompassing Parsonian problem of 
social order with the dual problematic of ‘society’ and ‘polity’. This amounted to the 
restoration of a forgotten Continental discourse on ‘state’ and ‘society’ that had been 
somewhat submerged in Parsons’ later functionalist reading of Weber. The state–
society relationship is always an historical eventuation rather than a functionally or 
normatively defined outcome. In this way, Bendix (1962) proposes a characteristically 
unresolved liberal discourse on democracy; the ‘state’ cannot impose political 
integration from above, while ‘society’ cannot generate normative social consensus 
from below (p. 478). This restoration of the historical problematic relationship between 
coercion and consensus, state and society resonates with Weber’s anti-utopian realism 
(Geuss, 2010). It was also the key to Bendix’s critique of ‘methodological nationalism’ 
(i.e. the conflation of society with the nation-state) that was to become a defining 
feature of his historical sociology (Bendix, 1964; Chernilo, 2007).[AQ6] 
Third, although Bendix provides one of the first serious and sustained attempts to 
extricate Weber’s legacy from the systematic innovations of Parsons’ theoretical 
synthesis, he is not concerned with providing a theoretical alternative to functionalism. 
Bendix was always a reluctant Weberian, as some of former students can attest; and he 
was not an advocate of ‘conflict theory’ (Collins, 1998). Instead, his overall goal was to 
place Weber within the framework of an interpretative tradition of comparative 
historical sociology that constantly questions the grand theoretical claims of sociology 
over history, of society over culture (Bendix 1967). Unlike Parsons, who attacked the 
‘historicist’ weakness of Weber’s sociological enterprise by affirming Weber’s 
apparent methodological intention to vindicate the universal applicability of ‘general 
theoretical concepts’ in sociology, Bendix (1962) treated Weber’s method as primarily 
the retrospective interpretation of the historians’ practice, and as such concerned with 
concepts of ‘limited applicability’ (pp. 268–281). With this reformulation, Bendix 
repositioned Weber as a comparative historian within a Geisteswissenschaft tradition of 
historical scholarship and research that affirmed the practical challenges of cultural–
historical understanding, rather than the theoretical ambitions of sociology (Caldwell, 
2002; Calhoun, 1996; Steinmetz, 2009). 
  
Fourth, although Bendix claimed that he did not want to offer ‘yet another 
interpretation’, his Intellectual Portrait offers more than a systematic exposition of 
Weber’s substantive work (Bendix, 1962: 258, 1965b: 10). The act of capsulisation 
constituted a coherent and often persuasive reinterpretation of Weber as a comparative 
historical sociologist concerned with the paradoxes of ‘reason and freedom in the 
Western world’, and it was through this reading of Weber as a ‘liberal’ historicist and 
humanist that Bendix partly affirmed his own intellectual self-identity as a Weberian ( 
1962: 9). For Bendix’s broader goal was to create a form of comparative historical 
sociology that could explore the unique realities of the Western experience of 
modernity in the light of the present challenges facing non-Western societies and 
cultures (Arnason, 2010). By ‘thinking with’ Weber, Bendix may not have discovered 
Weber’s ‘authorial intentions’, or the thematic unity of his oeuvre, but he had created 
an intellectual genealogy for his own work. In this sense, the Intellectual Portrait is not 
just an act of renewal in understanding Weber’s work, it is also a statement of Bendix’s 
own intellectual self-portrait as a comparative historian and a Weberian. 
Finally, there is a broader purpose to this re-reading and reinstatement of Bendix’s 
Weber. The essay is a contribution to the understanding of ‘the Weberian legacy’, but 
not just from the perspective of Weber scholarship and research. Re-reading Bendix’s 
Intellectual Portrait is not going to break the hold of competing interpretations, nor 
will it finally exorcise Parsons’ theoretical reading through a complete 
‘deparsonification’ of the Weberian legacy (Roth, 2007: 49).The task instead is to 
suggest a genealogical counterhistory, one that proposes a plurality of possible 
interpretations which only partly fit the conventional historical narratives of translation, 
reception, diffusion, adaptation and institutionalisation of Weber’s legacy in America. 
Scaff (2014) has recently constructed a marvellously intricate and ecumenical narrative 
of the Weberian legacy by searching for the common threads that run through so much 
of Weber-inspired research, scholarship and interpretation, while still recognising that 
the terms ‘Weberian’ or ‘neo-Weberian’ are deeply contentious and divisive, not just 
within ‘Weberism’ but also for those that might get stranded in the external boundary 
disputes with any number of ‘isms’ and their hybrids (e.g. Weberian Marxism, 
Analytical Weberianism). What holds these disparate coteries of Weberians together 
across their subject divides, disciplinary boundaries and cultural differences is not the 
‘objective’ content of Weber’s work or the affirmation of a political value choice 
regarding its meaning, but rather the definition of the ‘intellectual commitments’ of 
Weberians. For Scaff, the Weberian legacy is not what Weber intended, it is the 
retrospective construction of all those who are inspired and influenced by his work. But 
this creates a dilemma: is there a coherent set of Weberian ‘intellectual commitments’ 
and can they be identified with a theory, paradigm, research programme, methodology, 
or are they bound up with something much broader, a philosophical perspective or 
intellectual tradition that goes beyond the confines of the social sciences (Scaff, 2014: 
3, 170)? Compounding this issue, Weber’s texts are not authoritative guides to 
commitment, scholarly or political; they only catch his thought in flight, they confirm 
the complete incompleteness of his work and they open his oeuvre to endless 
misunderstandings and ‘creative misinterpretations’. The Weberian legacy is more a 
hermeneutical circle or spiral rather than a linear narrative, more about embracing 
differences and trying to make sense of them than defining enduring intellectual 
commitments, more a ‘genealogy of knowledges’, and a plurality of interpretations and 
‘discursive practices’, rather than the reconstruction of a linear intellectual history. The 
exploration of the Weberian legacy therefore creates new discontinuities by opening up 
  
spaces that will be filled by new disputes and new interpretations. Bendix’s Weber as 
an interpretative artefact is part of this Weberian legacy as is the Parsonian Weber, and 
there are many other readings of Weber that deserve exploration. But Bendix’s 
interpretation strives for authenticity and coherence; he wants to de-Americanise 
Weber by restoring the intellectual voice of the German Weber but within the humanist 
traditions of classic European liberalism. For those that thought the interpretative 
appropriation of the Weberian legacy would somehow secure the ‘future of sociology’ 
or transcend it, Bendix’s historicist reading suggests that Weber’s defence of the West 
may be an artefact of Western modernity. It is ultimately this virtue of ambivalence that 
turns the Intellectual Portrait into a 'classic' interpretation of Weber, and like all great 
interpretations of Weber it is not going to be eclipsed by cumulative advances of 
Weber scholarship. 
The Weberian legacy: The origins of the Intellectual Portrait 
Bendix’s Intellectual Portrait was conceived partially in response to the limits of 
Parsons’ authoritative imprint on Weber and the disparate legacy of Weber translations. 
He began seriously reading Weber (1947) in the late 1940s and it is perhaps no surprise 
he had written to Parsons shortly after the publication of The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organisation to enquire whether this was to be followed by further 
translations from Economy and Society (author communication with Bendix, 10 
November 1982). Parsons’ cordial reply was no. Economy and Society was being 
taught at graduate schools and more chapter translations were to eventually appear (e.g. 
Chapter 16, The City, 1958), but the posthumously ‘complete’ text was not to be 
available in translation until 1968. The diffuse translation process appears to have been 
a catalyst for Bendix’s project, as it was for others, but his ambition was always 
broader (Roth, 2007: 42; Scaff, 2014: 15–16). C. Wright Mills (1960) lamented the 
inability of American scholarship to truly unravel Weber’s legacy and he felt that Hans 
Gerth, his mentor, close friend and co-author, should do the job and perhaps finally 
slay the Parsonian Weber, the nemesis of his sociological imagination (p. 16). Mills 
(1960) was therefore deeply disappointed when he reviewed Bendix’s Intellectual 
Portrait; it was not an intellectual biography but a ‘collection of paraphrases’ (p. 16). 
This was a familiar misunderstanding of Bendix’s broader intentions, although 
ironically the reception of the Intellectual Portrait in Germany was much more positive 
(Roth, 1977b: 93). Bendix sought to provide a systematic exposition of Weber’s work, 
but as ‘a comprehensive whole’ that was thematically coherent (Bendix, 1962: xix). If 
the first task was primarily ‘expository’, the second was to be achieved by making 
accessible the tremendous diversity and comparative range of Weber’s analysis of ‘the 
development of rationalism in Western civilisation’ (Bendix, 1962: 9). In practice, 
exposition was translation and interpretation. 
Parsons was, of course, also strongly committed to an analytical overview, and he 
may have gradually realised that Bendix’s synthesising labours might undermine or at 
least partially decouple his own claims to carry forward and transcend Weber’s 
sociological legacy (Parsons, 1972b: 202). It was undoubtedly these unifying concerns 
that helped fuel the recurrent sources of debate between both scholars (Parsons, 1972a: 
766–768, 1972b: 200–203). Yet although they were both aware of their ‘sharp 
theoretical differences’, this did not generate a grand clash of viewpoints, for the 
sources of dispute were often presented through a whole array of substantive research 
interests that militated against the emergence of a systematic dialogue (Bendix, 1988: 
  
133; Parsons, 1960: 750–752; Roth, 2007: 43). Nor was their professional 
correspondence extensive or close, except for a brief and illuminating exchange of 
letters during the lead-up to the politically charged Heidelberg conference in 1964, 
where they both stood shoulder to shoulder in defending Weber’s scholarly integrity 
(Bendix Papers, Box 2, Folder 49). Yet Parsons was in a paradoxical sense the ever 
present, if often silent or ‘absent interlocutor’ in the shadow dialogue of Bendix’s 
Intellectual Portrait. Indeed, Bendix was fully aware in retrospect that the historical 
self-image of Weber he wanted to create was deeply counter to Parsons’ sociological 
Weber – perhaps it is very ‘antithesis’ (Bendix, 1988). Conversely, Parsons was 
‘annoyed’ with the ‘absolute antithesis’ Bendix drew between Weber and Durkheim, 
perhaps because it was a surreptitious caricature of their own irreconcilable intellectual 
differences (Parsons, 1972b: 202). 
Crucially, Bendix’s substantive work was a direct challenge to the Weberian 
credentials of Parsonian-inspired modernisation theory which he felt was ahistorical 
and reductionist in its understanding of both Western development and the unique 
development patterns of non-Western societies and cultures. For Bendix, Weber’s 
sophisticated historical sociology could not be fitted into the narrow framework of 
Parsons’ evolutionary functionalism (Roth, 1977a: xiii). In particular, Bendix was 
perturbed by Parsons’ detailed 86-page Introduction to The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization (a three-chapter extract from Economy and Society). The 
Introduction indicated a significant shift in Parsons’ work, as well as being a 
continuation of his critical reading of Weber: it marked the move from his early focus 
on Weber as a theorist of capitalism and a precursor of the ‘voluntaristic theory of 
action’ towards a ‘structural functionalist’ perspective that proposed a ‘general theory 
of action’ and ‘system’. This ‘new’ critical reading of Weber was important not 
because it was ‘true’ or because it became institutionalised in some homogeneous or 
monolithic Parsonism, but because it coalesced around multiple and heterogeneous 
forms of ‘functionalism’, a term that Parsons believed best described a universal 
method rather than a school. Nonetheless, it was during this phase of his work that 
functional concepts became the touchstone for his theoretical critique of Weber. In the 
Introduction to The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, the word ‘function’ 
appeared with almost obsessive regularity in the critical evaluation of Weber’s 
continuing significance for systematic sociological theory. Parsons argued that Weber’s 
ideal type classifications were formulated in an ad hoc and fragmented manner, and as 
such, they could not provide the foundation for a systematic theory both of society and 
modernity. The essential concept in bridging the ‘serious gaps’ in Weber’s work was, 
in Parsons’ view, that of ‘function’ (Parsons, 1947: 24). His enthusiasm for 
functionalism as a theoretical leap forward was palpable. Only by understanding the 
functional nature of social relations could Weber (1947) have made the methodological 
link between his individual action categories and structural analysis; only by employing 
functional concepts could he have moved away from the individualising particularity of 
his historical analysis of ‘the structural peculiarities of modern Western society ... And 
only, in turn, in so far as problems involving the behaviour of total systems are tackled, 
can certain levels of empirical generalisations be attained’ (p. 24). Four years later, 
Parsons was to finally crystallise this critique with the publication of The Social System 
(1951). For Bendix, however, the sweeping claims of functionalism and systems theory 
regarding Western modernity were profoundly unsettling. As they gained institutional 
ascendancy during the 1950s, they threatened to eclipse those aspects of Weber’s work 
that he most admired: Weber the great comparative historical sociologist of Western 
  
politics and society who asked probing questions about the origins and direction of 
modernity. 
Images of society 
Chapter VIII of Bendix’s Intellectual Portrait, originally entitled ‘Max Weber’s Image 
of Society’ (1960, first edition), was a wide-ranging, if indirect, response to the 
functional perspective. Here, Bendix outlined a Weberian image of society that he 
sometimes implicitly counterpoised to that of Parsons, and which he used recurrently in 
the Intellectual Portrait to create his own self-image of Weber’s work. This was more 
than an expository concept for it contained the promise of a ‘creative synthesis’ 
(Hughes, 1961: 341). The idea was tentatively introduced in Chapter I (p. 9), further 
developed in Chapters II and IV and finally became a central theme of Chapters VIII 
and XII (Bendix, 1960). Bendix (1959a), however, had first indicated the implications 
of his approach in an essay co-authored with Bennet Berger, Images of Society and the 
Problems of Concept Formation in Sociology. Here, it was argued that sociological 
theories consist of a plurality of images of society that reflect the substantive interests 
and values of the interpreter. If we ignore these different interpretative viewpoints, we 
end up with ‘pseudo-controversies’ between competing schools. Reflecting on this 
essay almost 30 years later, Bendix (1988) suggested that Parsons had not addressed 
the intrinsic nature of the theoretical conflicts between competing schools, instead he 
had tried to eliminate these conflicts: ‘But this work of integration is based on yet 
another interpretation of society. In this case the definition of the “social fact” is 
derived from the belief that the concept “system” is indispensable for a scientific theory 
of society’ (p. 133). In Bendix’s (1988) view, there was an alternative to the idea of 
society as system: ‘My emphasis is on another image of society, an impulse of viewing 
the social worlds which facilitates the perception of common themes in many theories 
without attempting to replace that multiplicity with any one unified theory’ (p. 111). 
This nominalist plea for intellectual moderation and theoretical eclecticism was at the 
heart of Bendix’s (1988) comparative studies and his reading of Weber: ‘This image of 
society is the theoretical counterpart of comparative analysis’ (p. 125). 
Despite Bendix’s defence of theoretical eclecticism as an ideal founded on the 
comparative historian’s research practice, he found that his reading of Weber was 
constantly drawn into the ‘bifurcation of schools’, a danger that we now know is 
inherent in the generational conflicts between academic disciplines and sub-disciplines 
(Abbott, 2001). The disparate legacy of translation and the desire by some Parsonians 
to institutionalise and appropriate a Parsonian Weber as a representative of structural-
functionalism and modernisation theory compounded these issues (Almond, 1956, 
2007). Bendix (1962) was a reluctant participant in these fractural disputes, partly 
because he remained acutely aware that Weber’s intellectual legacy could ‘not be 
summarised or vulgarised so easily’ (p. 460). Certainly, Bendix’s own intellectual 
position has proved difficult to categorise; even Parsons, the master of classifications, 
had difficulty here. In his review of the Intellectual Portrait, he appeared to withhold 
classification, although he was clearly concerned with Bendix’s emphasis on ‘interests’ 
rather than ‘values’ in his overall reading of Weber. However, in a review of one of 
Bendix’s later works, Embattled Reason, he described Bendix as ‘self-consciously a 
certain type of Weberian’ who was ‘no naive rationalist of the Enlightenment 
persuasion’ (Parsons, 1972a: 767). Rather than amplify this characterisation in relation 
to Bendix’s historicist critique of ‘scientism’ and his search for an ‘intermediate 
  
position’ between rationalism and ‘sociological reductionism’, Parsons proceeded to 
position Bendix mainly in opposition to his own idea of society as a social system and 
his later reading of Weber as an evolutionary theorist (Bendix, 1962: 474; Parsons, 
1972a: 767).  
Notwithstanding the difficulty of classification, there was in fact a strong degree of 
internal consistency to Bendix’s intellectual self-identity, both as a ‘cultural Weberian’ 
and comparative historical sociologist of politics and society (Caldwell, 2002). If not 
always obvious in his substantive work, the two aspects of Bendix’s intellectual 
imagination were invariably connected in his reading of Weber. As Chapter VIII of his 
Intellectual Portrait (1960) explored Weber’s image of society in relation to his 
sociology of religion, the concluding section of the second edition (Bendix, 1962), 
Chapter XV, related this image to Weber’s political sociology. But this synthetic task 
had a broader purpose. Bendix (1962) wanted to ‘round out’ Weber’s place in ‘the 
context of European intellectual history’ and its ‘liberal tradition’ (p. xxv). This was an 
unfinished task that Parsons, in his review of the first edition of the Intellectual 
Portrait, suggested that Bendix might wish to follow-up at a later stage, although he 
may not have expected the outcome. Bendix (1962) enthusiastically took up the 
challenge, partly because it was already implicit in his apparently purely ‘expository’ 
review (p. xxiv). He located Weber’s corpus in a wide-ranging intellectual tradition 
that drew its inspiration from German historicism and humanism, and which included 
such luminaries of European intellectual history as Jacob Burckhardt and Alexis de 
Tocqueville, aristocratic and realist liberals who expressed foreboding regarding 
Enlightenment rationalism and the future of modern society (1962: 462, 1965a). This 
curiously eclectic intellectual tradition was defined by a comparative historical 
imagination that sought ‘to discover the genesis of historical configurations’ and to 
defend the values and cultural ideals of Western civilisation. By connecting this 
intellectual genealogy to an alternative image of society in the Intellectual Portrait, 
Bendix was expressing not only an inner affinity between his own work and his self-
image of Weber’s legacy but also implicitly challenging Parsons’ alternative reading. 
Interests and ideals: Weber’s ‘cryptic remark’ 
The central clue to Bendix’s attempt to reconstruct Weber’s image of society in the 
Intellectual Portrait was Weber’s famous ‘cryptic remark’ that ‘Not ideas, but material 
and ideal interests directly govern men’s conduct’. Unlike many interpreters, Bendix 
had taken this claim seriously, and he rejected the characterisation of Weber as an 
idealist (Tenbruck, 1980: 333). It was, however, Weber’s (1946) conditional 
proposition that made his statement about ideas and interests so problematic: ‘Yet very 
frequently the “world images” that have been created by “ideas” have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest’ 
(p. 280). Parsons had summarised this position in The Structure of Social Action: ‘Ideas 
are effective in action because they determine the direction of practical activity in 
which the interests can be pursued’ (Parsons, 1937 [1968]: 572). This was not a 
‘misreading’, but Parsons’ overall interpretation of Weber’s work often emphasised the 
primacy of ideas before interests. In contrast, Bendix appeared to reverse this emphasis, 
while arguing for the ‘relative autonomy’ of ideas and intellectual worldviews. In his 
view, 
  
Weber transformed the great insight of Marx by showing that material interests are linked to 
man’s inveterate quest for meaning and idealisation ... But Weber gave to human ideas and 
ideals as much weight as he did to economic interests, so that for him the drive for power or 
material success was always the starting point for an analysis of ideas. (Bendix, 1962: 481) 
It is this ‘double emphasis’ or ‘balanced emphasis on interests and ideas’ that 
Bendix partially unravelled when he argued that ‘according to Weber, material without 
ideal interests are empty, ideals without material interests are impotent’ (1962: 46–47, 
1965a: 177, 1978: 17). The dynamics of these subtle, shifting and complex 
interrelations could only be unravelled by the historian’s practice – not by a theoretical 
supposition about the primacy of ideas over interests or material over ideal factors 
(Schluchter, 1996: 226). Those who had, therefore, elevated Weber’s heuristic 
principles of comparative analysis into an argument for idealism over materialism had 
fundamentally misunderstood Weber’s epistemological practice. Weber’s ‘cryptic 
remark’ was not a theory of social change or a formula for ‘general explanations’ in 
Bendix’s judgement, but rather an invitation to probe the practical interrelationships 
and eventuations of interests and ideas through comparative historical investigation. 
For Bendix, the dual perspective on ‘interests’ and their relation to the dynamic of 
religious ideas and political power was at the heart of Weber’s work. Weber’s 
Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie, Bendix (1962) argued, ‘conceived of 
society as an arena of competing status groups each with its own economic interests, 
status honour, and orientation toward the world and man’ (p. 262). By analysing these 
groups and their material and ideal interests, the motivational impact of religious ideas 
on social conduct would become understandable: ‘The world view of the great world 
religions was the work of clearly identifiable social groups: the Puritan divines, the 
Confucian scholars, the Hindu Brahmins, and the Jewish Levites and prophets’ (1962: 
258). In contrast, Bendix (1962) argued that Economy and Society extended this 
analysis by exploring the dynamic of interests in relation to political power, authority 
and legitimacy: ‘that allocates the right to command and the duty to obey’ (p. 290). 
These ‘two perspectives’ were often combined in Weber’s historical analysis, although 
Bendix believed that Weber’s sociology of religion primarily analysed ‘constellations 
of interests’ in relation to worldviews or ideas, while his political sociology primarily 
analysed interests in relation to ‘types of domination’ (Bendix, 1962: 47, 289, ft9; 
1970: 152–153). Running through both, however, was the overarching idea of the 
‘irreconcilable’ struggles and conflicts over cultural values, religious beliefs, political 
ideals and economic interests that was ‘at the core of Max Weber’s personal and 
intellectual outlook’ (Bendix, 1962: 263). 
Bendix used this reading of Weber in the Intellectual Portrait to counter Parsons’ 
sociological view of the nature of social order (Bendix, 1962: 286–288). Parsons (1937 
[1968]) was acutely aware of this difference of perspective which echoed Weber’s 
‘tragic consciousness of the importance of coercion in human affirms’ (p. 658). He 
argued in his review of the Intellectual Portrait that Weber moved from the theoretical 
analysis of individual social action to a concept of ‘legitimate order’ founded on the 
‘normative control of interests’ because ‘Problems of order, as distinguished from 
those of categories of “interest” that define the primary subject-matter of economics 
and politics, thus constitute the core of sociological concern’ (Parsons, 1960: 174). And 
he directly criticised Bendix (1962) for overemphasising the ‘analytical dichotomy’ in 
Weber’s work between the ‘material’ factors associated with domination and power 
and the ‘ideal’ factors, norms and values, associated with legitimation: 
  
I do not believe that, either in his treatment of political problems or of the sociology of 
religion, Bendix does full justice to the extent to which Weber achieved an integration of the 
two sets of factors in a single coherent theoretical scheme. (p. 752) 
Bendix, of course, rejected the idea of a single theoretical scheme and its corollary, 
a universal and functional concept of ‘society’ as a regulative or normative ideal of 
modernity. He argued that Weber’s methodological writings avoided ‘sociological 
reductionism’ by linking the idea of interpretative understanding to the dynamics and 
contingencies of social and political action, rather than to any holistic concept of 
society or the state. In these terms, Weber located the culturally significant problematic 
of the modern Western social and political order within two distinct analytical 
domains: ‘society’ and the ‘polity’, each of which can be explored historically in terms 
of ‘constellation of interests’ and ‘types of domination’ (Bendix, 1962: 287). Bendix 
(1962) also argued that social order is possible because it is based on both interests and 
ideas and a ‘belief in legitimacy’ (p. 288). In this sense, Bendix’s historicist and realist 
reinstatement of ‘legitimacy’ is crucial in the reciprocal understanding of the state–
society relationship, a decisive factor that had been underplayed by functionalism and 
‘instrumental Weberism’(Anter 2014:52-53). Western societies have maintained some 
degree of social cohesion and interdependence by creating and sustaining shared ideals, 
values and beliefs and by institutionalising a framework for regulating economic 
exchange and instrumental market relationships. In contrast, the state may maintain 
‘legitimate order’ by a combination of power, coercion, authority, cultural values and 
enduring institutional practices. 
With this reformulation, Bendix opened up Weber’s realistic and often disturbing 
analysis of the political dynamics of modernity. By analysing ‘domination combined 
with administration’ and legitimacy as the legal enactment of domination, Bendix 
(1962) argued that Weber avoided any ‘idealisation’ or utopian vision of modern 
society, of the state or the nation as realms in which social values, norms, moral 
standards and political ideals are in harmony, or are likely to be in the future (pp. 262, 
286). There can be no conflation of modern society with the nation or the state; for 
society is a precarious entity, and the nation and the state are rarely identical. Nor can 
‘modern society’ as a normative ideal define the contingent outcomes of political 
modernity in Western or non-Western societies (Chernilo, 2007). In this way, Bendix 
replaced the Parsonian sociological problem of order in which politics is encompassed 
by society with a characteristically Weberian problematic in which the political 
analysis of power and legitimacy cannot fully account for the enduring nature of social 
order, and, conversely, the sociological analysis of interests, ideas and values cannot 
fully account for the enduring nature of politics and government (Bendix, 1988: 277, 
ft48, 49). At the core of modern capitalist society is a marketplace dominated by 
conflicting instrumental interests that cannot be resolved. At the core of the modern 
nation and state is a form of legal domination founded on the ‘insolvable conflict 
between the formal and substantive rationality of law’ (Bendix, 1962: 484). 
Bendix (1983a) was also to carry his essentially historical objections to functionalist 
conceptions of society to the theoretical core of this perspective: the linkage of 
‘function’ and ‘purpose’ (pp. 132–133). If function and purpose are conflated, then one 
is almost inevitably driven towards evolutionary and teleological modes of explanation 
in which the increasing ‘structural differentiation’ between the parts of the social 
system serves the ‘needs’ of the system as a whole: differentiation carries the 
evolutionary assumption that ‘society’ serves functional purposes (Bendix, 1953: 13). 
  
Worse still, for Bendix the functional emphasis on ‘why’ social systems exist was 
replacing the historical sociological analysis of ‘how’ social changes occur: the detailed 
historical explanation of the origins, causes and divergent outcomes of modernity was 
being lost in the abstract universal functionality of system needs or imperatives 
(Whimster, 2007: 191–192). Ultimately, functionalism appeared as an ahistorical, 
inherently circular and deductive mode of analysis devoid of real explanatory insight 
(Bendix, 1953: 7–16, 1970: 150–154). 
 
Weber’s ‘central’ texts 
With his two-sided formulation of the state–society relationship in the Intellectual 
Portrait, Bendix gave the Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie and Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft equal weight in his overall interpretation of Weber’s work, a balance 
that was decisive in his recovery of Weber’s political sociology. The importance of this 
balanced interpretative stance towards Weber’s work is often forgotten or 
misinterpreted. Characteristically, Parsons in his early readings of Weber focused 
primarily on The Protestant Ethic and the studies of the world religions, rather than on 
the equally important sociology of bureaucracy, politics, law and domination that 
occupied a core position within the diffuse typological frameworks of Economy and 
Society (Cohen et al., 1975: 237). A brief glance at the four chapters of The Structure of 
Social Action concerned with Weber’s work reveals that only one chapter sub-section 
is focused on political analysis, while two complete chapters examine the sociology of 
religion (Cohen et al., 1975: 237). This allocation of space seems somewhat 
inappropriate, especially given the vital theoretical location and quantitative extent of 
the sociology of domination in Economy and Society. Indeed, Roth (1978) has 
suggested that these concerns define the ‘central theme’ of the work (p. lxxxviii). 
Parsons’ reluctance, even in his later writings, to provide a sustained interpretation of 
Economy and Society, with the notable exception of a pioneering discussion of Weber’s 
‘economic sociology’, seriously undermined his claim to provide a systematic 
overview of Weber’s theoretical corpus (Alexander, 1983: 20–21; Parsons, 1947: 30–
55). 
Interestingly, Bendix who has often been closely associated with an ‘instrumental’ 
and ‘exaggerated’ emphasis on domination and conflict in Weber’s political sociology 
also made The Protestant Ethic and the comparative studies of the world religions a 
pervasive element in his general overview of Weber’s work (Kalberg, 1997: 210). In 
Bendix’s (1962) view, Weber undertook the comparative study of the world religions 
to establish ‘what was distinctive for the West by a comparison of the causes and 
consequences of religious beliefs in different civilizations’ (p. 84). In his concise 
exposition of Weber’s monograph on Ancient Judaism, he also provided a powerful 
affirmation of the power of religious ideas and interests in defining the differentiation 
between Occidental and Oriental religiosity which appeared so fateful for the ‘moral 
rationalism of Western civilisation’ (1962: 256, 279). In this respect, Bendix (1962) 
never lost sight of Weber’s emphasis on the role of religious ideas and beliefs in his 
‘analysis of the manifold relations between man’s ideal and material interests’, 
although he was often critical of the way in which Weber ‘inadvertently obscured’ the 
actual impact of ideas on practical conduct (pp. 13, 275–276). Indeed, Bendix even 
went so far as to emphasise that almost all of Weber’s later writings on law, politics 
  
and economics were ‘continuations of the sociology of religion’, a view that may be 
questioned given the chronological sequencing, analytical disjunctions and overlapping 
themes of Weber’s writings on religion (Whimster, 2007). However, Bendix (1962) 
was equally sweeping in his emphasis on the political exploration of domination and 
legitimacy in Economy and Society, which he considered to be Weber’s most 
‘systematic work’ (p. 473). He therefore observed of Weber’s concerns that ‘In 
conception and scope his political analysis stands on a par with his sociology of 
religion’, although again Bendix was less than convincing in providing a chronological 
rationale for this viewpoint’ (Mommsen, 2000; Whimster, 2007). Nevertheless, his 
generally even-handed textual approach was inclusive in its broad approach to Weber’s 
substantive work – at least that which was widely available at that time. 
It was, however, Bendix’s focus on Economy and Society, and his essentially 
Weberian view of political power as the product of the irreducible conflicts between 
divergent group interests, that undoubtedly helped to define his profound distance from 
Parsons’ later functionalist reading of Weber (Whimster, 2007: 232). Parsons appeared 
reluctant to view power in relation to ‘interests’ and its corollary, the legitimation of 
power by ‘ideology’. Power appeared to be by definition ‘legitimate’, for it was 
conceived as the extension of a pregiven consensus that arose from the primacy of a 
social system of shared values: the state is within society. It may have been this 
normative sociological view that led Parsons to the controversial translation of 
Herrschaft (domination or ruleship) as ‘imperative coordination’, a translation that 
Bendix ultimately objected to on the grounds of the autonomous role of politics in 
Weber’s typological schemata of domination and legitimacy (Bendix, 1962: 292, ft16; 
Parsons, 1960: 752, 1975: 669–672). For Weber, politics was inseparable from ‘the 
domination of man over man’ exercised through ‘legitimate domination’, and, in so far 
as legitimacy sought to explain, justify and maintain the existing power relations and 
inequalities, it was potentially a form of ideology. Although Weber refused to embrace 
a reductionist concept of ideology (i.e. religious worldviews are not reducible to social 
power), he was constantly aware of how legitimacy occurs through interests, beliefs 
and ideas (Whimster, 2007: 230). Parsons believed, however, that he could somehow 
overcome the constituent interests that underpinned the moral and ideological 
framework of free market capitalism with a normative image of ‘modern society’ 
conceived as social system of shared values. In Bendix’s (1988) view, this was just as 
profoundly misguided as the once radical bourgeoisie idea of a civil society in which 
property and equality were compatible (p. 149). 
Discussion: The intellectual self-portrait of a Weberian 
Bendix’s efforts in the Intellectual Portrait to free Weber’s political sociology from the 
legacy of functionalism and return it to the domain of politics, power and the state have 
proved in the long run to be remarkably successful (Anter 2014; Chernilo, 2007; 
Collins, 1998). By exploring the partly autonomous realms of the society–state 
relationship, Bendix (1964) had reinstated the role of politics in understating the 
dynamics of state formation and modernisation: 
In the societies of Western civilisation we should ... accept the existence of a hiatus between 
the forces making for social solidarity or conflict independently of government and the forces 
accounting for the continuous exercise of authority in the national community. (p. 169) 
  
Nation Building and Citizenship (1964) was a testimony to how illuminating this 
Weberian informed mode of analysis could be in practice (Barbalet, 2010). Bendix 
(1988) primarily explored the differences between medieval and modern political 
patterns of authority and how the ‘democratic revolutions’ of the seventeenth and 
eighteen centuries turned subjects into citizens (p. 279). In this respect, Bendix’s 
emphasis on the interaction between states and civil societies in the formation of new 
national political communities searching for modernity can be seen as a continuation of 
Weber’s work as well as a corrective to the conventional overemphasis on the 
Protestant ethic thesis (Bendix, 1968: 8; Collins, 1986: 39–44). Certainly, the emphasis 
on state power was a recurrent theme in almost all of Bendix’s work, and it lent a hard 
instrumental realism to his Weberian reading of politics and power. 
The focus on the state or power as a ‘model’ of political analysis and social change 
should not, however, be overstated; especially given the diffuse comparative 
dimensions of Bendix’s work and his explicit disavowal of theoretical generalisations, 
including modernisation theories (Bendix, 1967;1996). Although the issues of state 
power and legitimacy are pervasive thematics in the Intellectual Portrait that are 
further developed in his substantive studies of Nation-Building and Citizenship, and 
Kings or People, Bendix’s historical time-frame, varied intellectual interests, eclectic 
choice of cases and shifting comparative narratives wilfully defy any hopes of creating 
theoretical models or ‘bold generalisations’ regarding the dynamics of economic and 
political modernity. Moreover, by affirming contingency over necessity in his historical 
sociology, Bendix was a forceful critic of ‘methodological nationalism’: how nations 
and 'modern' states emerged in the West was a contingent outcome and this was likely 
to be the historical experience of non-Western societies (Chernilo, 2007). This explains 
why the case studies chosen in Bendix’s comparative studies, both Western and non-
Western, were an affirmation of particularity and cultural variation, rather than an 
exploration of how developmental pathways might be convergent, parallel or 
repeatable (Ringer, 1997: 91, 152). For Bendix, the dynamics between state and society 
and citizenship and democratisation in the West constituted a ‘singular historical 
breakthrough’ to modernity that cannot be repeated or replicated by follower societies: 
each new path to industrial development and democratisation is unique: there are 
‘multiple modernities’ (Bendix, 1964: 410–411; Collins, 1986: 34–35). If Weber left us 
without an answer to the peculiar ‘origins’ of Western modernity and its ‘uniqueness’ 
(was it a concatenation of contingent events?), Bendix leaves us with no answers as to 
the future of modernities in non-Western societies. 
Positioning Weber’s legacy as interpreted by Bendix in the context of a political 
sociology of the state, an ideal of ‘Weberian sociological theory’, or a concept of 
‘political modernity’ is equally problematic (Chernilo, 2007; Collins, 1998). The 
Intellectual Portrait did not seek to provide a theoretical overview of Weber’s work; 
there was no systematic effort to develop an alternative to the functionalist viewpoint 
or modernisation theory (Kalberg, 1997). Nor did he envisage the search for a synthesis 
of social order and conflict, worldviews and interests. Instead, Bendix (1962) 
emphasised how Weber sub-divided his concepts and typologies into ‘manageable’ 
units of comparative analysis that could be applied to specific historical issues or 
particular cases (pp. 276–277). In addition, his overall reading of Weber’s analysis of 
the relationship between state and society as a precarious balance between opposing 
counter-forces or ‘hypothetical extremes’ of ‘societal tendencies of action’ 
(Vergessellschaftung) is still powerful and provocative, and it is congruent with more 
recent Weber scholarship concerned with translating Weber’s action categories into 
  
macro-social analysis (Kalberg, 2012). More generally, Bendix’s reading of Weber’s 
work in the Intellectual Portrait is compatible with a shift towards a plurality of 
theoretical models that no longer begin with the search for a general theory of society, 
economy or a singular ideal of political modernity (Chernilo, 2008; Eisenstadt, 1998, 
2003). He followed Weber’s nominalist disaggregation of society into separate spheres 
or domains not to defend a realm of individual freedom in the face of the ‘iron cage’ of 
inexorable bureaucratic rationalisation that Weber feared, but to partly expose the 
inequalities that characterised the social world and power relations within societies that 
sought to pursue democratic pathways. In this sense, he partly reaffirmed Weber’s 
realism without fully embracing the ‘brutality and romance’ of his political pessimism: 
the fate of the ‘West’ and political modernity in non-Western societies are partly 
decoupled (Bendix, 1962: 9). 
Undoubtedly, Bendix’s consistent reluctance to fully explore the more systematic 
theoretical aspects of Weber’s work, and especially the ‘developmental’ typologies of 
Economy and Society, can be partly explained by his plea for theoretical eclecticism as 
the reference point for his comparative method (Bendix, 1962: 326). But perhaps, more 
importantly, it was deeply connected with the all-embracing portrait of Weber, the 
comparative historical sociologist that Bendix wished to create as the self-image of his 
own intellectual enterprise. Above all, Bendix extolled the virtues of historical self-
consciousness in understating the uniqueness of Western social and political 
institutions and the particularity and comparative richness of each case study of 
political modernity. For Bendix, the origins of modernity in the West were as diverse 
and complex as the possibilities of political modernity in non-Western societies. Weber 
had in Bendix’s (1962) judgement been acutely aware of this dilemma: ‘He was 
especially concerned with the possibility that his study of legal domination and of 
ethical rationalism would be mistaken for a partisan defence of rationality and Western 
civilization’ (p. 388). Emulating this concern, Bendix made no attempt in his own 
comparative studies to subsume cases under a theoretical framework or set of 
developmental propositions (Bendix, 1956, 1963, 1987). And unlike some variants of 
neo-Weberian historical sociology, Bendix consistently refused to imbue the political 
with a hard instrumental efficacy or explanatory primacy (Collins, 1986: 145–150; 
Mann, 1986: 30). Tellingly, it was Parsons (1960) in his review of the Intellectual 
Portrait who complemented Bendix on the way he dealt with the complex 
interpenetration of ‘cultural and social phenomena’ in the presentation of Weber’s 
political sociology (p. 751). Parsons was right. Bendix was a ‘cultural Weberian’, but 
without sharing Parsons’ positive political vision of ‘modern society’ as a universal 
ideal with an evolutionary destiny. Instead, Bendix emphasised the historicist 
underpinnings of Weber’s typological enterprise to such an extent that even the hint of 
a ‘theory’ or development scheme of large-scale political change, state-and-nation 
formation or geopolitical conflict was consciously disaggregated and returned to the 
particularity of historical evidence (Chernilo, 2007: 109; Mann, 1993: 44–89; 
Schluchter, 1981: 86). The emphatic statement at the conclusion of his review of 
Weber’s concept of ‘traditional domination’ in the Intellectual Portrait expressed a 
characteristic statement of intent and an attitude towards developmental ideas: ‘The 
foregoing analysis is typological, not developmental’ (Bendix, 1962: 381). Similarly, 
most of Bendix’s mild and empathetic criticisms of Weber’s typology of domination 
and his ‘overemphasis’ on bureaucratisation focused on the historical utility and limits 
of his concepts, rather than issues of the broader theoretical coherence of his work 
(Kalberg, 2012). Indeed, Bendix (1964) did not hesitate to historically relativise the 
  
heuristic value of ‘Weber’s categoric distinction between legitimate authority and 
constellations of interests’ by questioning its ethnocentric origins in an understanding 
of Western political institutions (p. 28). It was the historical richness and delimited 
comparative dimensions of Weber’s writings on domination, power and legitimacy that 
were most prized: ‘The value of Weber’s analysis lies in its problem orientation and in 
the clarification of historical materials’ (Bendix, 1962: 326). Ultimately, Bendix’s 
recovery of Weber’s political sociology in the Intellectual Portrait was subsumed by 
his wide-ranging reinterpretation of the scope, significance and limitations of Weber’s 
comparative historical exploration of the origins and uniqueness of Western society. 
If the Intellectual Portrait succeeded in repositioning and redefining Weber’s legacy 
as a comparative historical sociologist, this was achieved with some important critical 
limitations. Unlike The Structure of Social Action, which enthusiastically embraced 
Weber’s apparently ‘central methodological concern’ with vindicating the universal 
applicability of ‘general theoretical concepts’ in the socio-historical sciences (Parsons, 
1937 [1968]: 640, 1965: 173), the Intellectual Portrait deliberately refrained from 
examining Weber’s voluminous methodological writings (some 600 pages) in any 
detail (Bendix, 1962: xxiii, 280). This was a judicious and pragmatic decision, 
especially given the substantive scope of Bendix’s task, and the notoriously 
inconsistent, disjointed and often obtuse nature of Weber’s methodological writings 
(Whimster, 2007: 49). It had, however, much broader interpretative implications. 
Bendix’s limited discussion of method tended to accentuate the particularity of 
Weber’s historical exposition, and this obviated against a more general appraisal of the 
analytical or theoretical frameworks of his writings (Kalberg, 2012). He modestly 
described his overall task of presenting Weber’s fragmented and difficult writings as 
‘an effort to reorganise, to eliminate digressions and details, to omit whole parts where 
these detract from the main line of argument, and to put together materials when they 
belong to the same context, regardless of where they appeared originally’ (Bendix, 
1962: xxiv). This act of concision tended, however, to create principally a narrative 
order in the presentation of ‘an intricate web of related themes’, rather than a formal or 
analytical cohesiveness in the interpretation of Weber’s ideas (Bendix, 1962: 84). 
Bendix’s thematic approach also allowed him to skip over the chronological 
discontinuities of Weber’s work and the disjunctions and shifting focus of his research 
interests. In this way, the equivocations and disjunctions in Weber’s historical analysis 
could be seen as essentially products of the historians’ shifting and eclectic utilisation 
of concepts, rather than the outcome of confusing intellectual intentions or perhaps 
theoretical failures (Caldwell, 2002: 43–45; Parsons, 1937: 601–610). Certainly, 
Bendix’s reading appeared to limit the possibility that Weber’s causal analytical 
understanding of history might be integral to his comparative method (Ringer, 1997: 
161–162). For Bendix (1962), causal analysis was ‘only one of several problems’ that 
Weber explored in his comparative studies (p. 84). Indeed, Bendix’s consistent fidelity 
to a self-conception of Weber’s intellectual enterprise as one defined by historical 
particularity invariably undermined the validity of any claim to treat Weber as a 
‘rigorous sociological theorist’ concerned with causal propositions and generalisations 
– however daunting it might be to sustain this claim in the face of Weber’s fragmented, 
confusing and incomplete legacy. 
Finally, no evaluation of Bendix’s legacy as an interpreter of Weber’s work would 
be complete without commenting on the absence in the Intellectual Portrait of any 
systematic discussion of Weber’s political values and ideals, or the broader 
significance of his occasional political writings. Like the omission of a discussion of 
  
Weber’s methodology, this revealed more than a pragmatic drawing of manageable 
boundaries in documenting Weber’s substantive historical corpus. Bendix’s Intellectual 
Portrait was published just after the publication in Germany of Wolfgang Mommsen’s 
controversial study Max Weber and German Politics 1890–1920 (1984 [1959]). No 
two books could be more different. Mommsen offered a sustained and often brilliant 
interrogation of Weber’s nationalist political ideals, and he questioned his enduring 
legacy for a post-war generation trying to come to terms with the catastrophe of 
fascism. This was counterhistory as the critique of ideology and a polemical corrective 
to liberal hagiography. The ‘fallacy’ of Weber, the objective-minded sociologist and 
potential founding father of a modern German liberal political tradition, was 
counterposed to a devastatingly critical image of Weber as a disillusioned ‘liberal 
imperialist’ locked in a heroic and futile struggle against the stultifying bureaucratic 
institutions of imperial Germany. 
Bendix was perplexed with this singular reading of Weber as a strident German 
nationalist (Bendix, 1962: ft2, 471; Roth, 2007: 45). In the Intellectual Portrait, he 
warned the reader that the overemphasis on the historically conditioned nature of 
Weber’s scholarly writings and his ‘frequently crude German nationalism’ might 
detract from an understanding and utilisation of Weber’s enduring intellectual 
achievement (Bendix, 1962: 10). For Bendix (1962), ‘Weber also combined this 
nationalism with a fundamental commitment to the study of non-European cultures 
whose basic assumptions made sense and had value in their own terms’ (p. 10). Yet 
paradoxically, it was by this very separation between work and person, scholarship and 
partisanship, between Western and non-Western rationalism, that a liberal self-image 
of Weber’s work entered pervasively, if indirectly, into Bendix’s interpretation. For it 
was through the very imposing fabric and subtlety of his historical exposition that one 
can discern the traces of a gentle and sober ‘intellectual portrait’ of Weber as a scholar 
of enormous erudition, extraordinary comparative insights and exemplary scientific 
integrity – the historian of Western culture, society and politics par excellence. It was 
through this integral portrayal, which placed Weber unambiguously within ‘the 
intellectual heritage of European liberalism’, rather than simply German cultural 
traditions, that Bendix (1960) attempted ‘to bring to the fore the thematic coherence of 
Weber’s sociological work, which arises from this liberal tradition’ (p. xxiv). 
In retrospect, this was one area in which Parsons and Bendix, despite their many 
differences, appeared to be in broad agreement (Parsons, 1972a: 767, 1972b: 201). 
Parsons had written to Bendix before the now famous Heidelberg conference in April 
1964 to express his disappointment with the highly critical contributions of Raymond 
Aron and Herbert Marcuse, which made him realise that he would be ‘something of a 
Daniel in the Lion’s den’ (Bendix papers, letter, 6 April 1964). Bendix wrote back 
expressing his fear that Weber would become ‘a whipping-boy of the unresolved 
intellectual legacies of Germany for the last half century’ (Bendix papers, letter, 9 April 
1964). At that moment, Parsons and Bendix were in agreement. For they both viewed 
Weber’s controversial plea for ‘value neutrality’ as a liberal defence of the institutions 
of science and learning in the face of sectarian modes of political irrationality and value 
conflict (Gerhardt, 2011; Roth, 2007). But the issues went far beyond scholarship. In 
the volatile context of counter-cultural politics, student radicalism and New Left ideas, 
academic liberalism and the Weberian sociological corpus were increasingly identified 
with the emergence of an ‘iron cage’ of ‘totalitarian bureaucracy’ and a ‘one-
dimensional’ society. From this perspective, Parsons’ and Bendix’s readings of Weber 
were often lumped together as the twin theoretical apologetics for the identification of 
  
‘Western reason’ with the triumph of capitalism and the domination of scientism. 
Parsons and Bendix certainly shared deep affinities in their ‘liberal’ defence of Weber, 
scientific objectivity and the university against the utopian ethics of Marcuse’s ‘Great 
Refusal’(Bendix 1971). But Parsons and Bendix were very different liberals, although 
this did not seem to matter for those who wanted to redefine the politics of scholarship. 
Parsons’ liberal idealism and Bendix’s liberal realism were simply treated as the Janus 
faced expression of academic conservatism. This rhetorical elision of the meaning of 
the word ‘liberal’ illustrates once again just how difficult it is to evaluate the integrity 
of Bendix’s reading of Weber in isolation from Parsons, both Parsons the sociological 
theorist and Parsons the inspiration for an American ideal of universal modernity. With 
the passage of time, however, Bendix’s reading of Weber can now be more clearly 
defined in its own terms. Unlike Parsons, who appeared to ‘supersede’ Weber’s 
disenchanted and instrumental politics of liberalism with a normative and modernist 
sociological vision of moral progress, rationality and social order, Bendix related 
Weber’s enduring legacy to a more stoical, historicist and realist reading of Western 
history: to Weber’s anti-utopian vision of a future characterised by moral relativism, 
‘embattled reason’ and the ever present spectre of authoritarian politics (Bendix, 1962: 
466, 1984: 19, 1986: 280). Weber may not, in Bendix’s (1962) judgement, have 
anticipated the grim totalitarian ideologies of national socialism or soviet communism, 
but his historical analysis of the potential subversion of democracy by bureaucracy, of 
individual freedom by political power, of politics by utopian ethics was ‘a testimony to 
his genius’ (pp. 466–468). For Bendix (1983b), Weber the comparative historian and 
Weber the anti-utopian defender of reason and individual freedom were inseparable. 
Fused together within his exposition of Weber’s comparative research, Bendix (1960) 
could create his own inspirational self-image of Weber’s work and affirm in the very 
final sentence of his Intellectual Portrait the moral and liberal mission of historical 
scholarship: ‘Weber’s life work appears, as he conceived it, as an analysis and defence 
of Western civilisation’ (p. 494). 
Conclusion 
By revisiting Bendix’s intellectual Portrait of Weber, we may gain a greater 
understanding of the genealogy of the ‘field’ of Weber scholarship and interpretation, 
of a genealogical counterhistory that questions Parsons’ reading while still retaining 
what Bendix most admired, the cultural capital that is Max Weber: the heroic liberal 
conscience of reason and individual freedom in the disenchantment world of Western 
modernity. To some extent, this is still what Weber means to many Weberians (Scaff, 
2014). Re-reading the Intellectual Portrait, therefore, has a ritual function; it allows us 
to think of what may bind ‘Weberians’ together, or what an authentic Weberian 
interpretation of Weber might look like (Ringer, 2004; Scaff, 2014). Of course, since 
the publication of the Intellectual Portrait, the textual legacy of Weber’s oeuvre has 
become much more secure, so there are unlikely to be any major new surprises. But 
Weber’s interpretive legacy is more than a list of his classic texts, if we could ever 
decide what they are, for they seem to be constantly subject to reinterpretation. The 
final completion of the Max Weber-Gesamtausgabe is unlikely to change that 
(Whimster, 2012). The uncomfortable truth is that Weber’s legacy is constructed by his 
interpreters; for ‘misinterpretations’ and the constant search for new or more authentic 
readings is what determines Weber’s continuing significance, especially for those who 
believe that we still live in 'the age of Weber'. This is partly why the endless 
  
controveries over what constitutes Weber’s oeuvre or Weber’s central texts will 
continue within the hermeneutic of Weber scholarship (Chalcraft et al., 2008). While 
Weber scholarship has certainly made great advances, and the possibility of a divide 
between ‘older Weber studies’ and ‘new Weber studies’ is a useful heuristic in partly 
defining the ‘modernist’ legacy of Parsons and Bendix, there is no sense in which one 
reading simply supersedes another in some cumulative process (Chalcraft et al., 2008: 
19). The Weberians may have ‘won’ in their textual re-reading of Weber over the last 
few decades, but Weber’s influence on Parsons and the legacy of Parsonism as well as 
the possibilities of ‘re-Parsonising’ Weber are still very much alive (Gerhardt, 2011; 
Habermas, 1984; Schluchter, 1981; Stone, 2010). This suggests that any attempt to 
classify the authenticity of a Weberian reading may be somewhat futile; there are 
almost as many Webers as there are interpreters of his work. And if there was a ‘real 
Weber’ before Weber interpretation, his legacy has so far proved elusive.Nevertheless, 
by reviewing classic interpretations of Weber, or by constantly exploring the cultural 
genealogy of Weber scholarship through new insights and interpretations, we may be 
able to ask whether there is an emerging ‘canon’ of Weber interpretation, and most 
importantly who is included and excluded? If Bendix deserves an honourable place, or 
a simple plaque in the halls of Weber-inspired comparative historical sociology, it is 
because each reading of Weber has a context. Weber mattered to Bendix, not just 
because Bendix looked back to the fading hopes of Enlightenment rationalism or the 
catastrophe of Nazi Germany as a Jewish émigré, but because he also looked towards 
the still problematic future of a world of multiple modernities. Unfortunately, Bendix 
knew only too well that while Weber asked the most searching questions about the 
origins and uniqueness of Western rationalism, he had few answers as to the fate of 
modernity for the West or the rest of the world. In the end, the fate of the West as an 
idea may determine what constitutes the Weberian legacy. 
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